Beirut, 12 November 2021
- Introduction
“Lebanon has been embroiled in an economic, social, financial and cost of living crisis that has pushed the country to the verge of complete collapse — an unprecedented crisis in the country’s modern history.” These were the words of the ministerial statement adopted on September 16th by the new government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati, when it took office ending 13 months of caretaker-status governments. This is still a new government, and it is working under exceptionally difficult circumstances. A number of important initiatives have been announced, and various strategies and action plans identify the was forward: the most significant are the Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF), designed in response to the Beirut port blast of 4 August 2020 with the European Union, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and which the Government of Lebanon has pledged to implement; and the Emergency Response Plan for Lebanon, issued in August 2021, prepared by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to support a coordinated humanitarian response to the country’s crisis. These frameworks provide important signposts for the reconstruction of the country, and for bridging the gap between the urgent humanitarian response required, and the long-term reconstruction effort needed. Yet, it is apparent to the Special Rapporteur that the political elites in the country, and the government in particular, still have not grasped the urgency of the situation. Lebanon is not a failed State yet. But it is a rapidly failing State, and unless swift and decisive measures are taken, its downwards spiral will accelerate.
The Special Rapporteur expresses his gratitude to the Government of Lebanon for having invited him to visit the country, particularly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants for its remarkable cooperation and support in the preparation of his visit. During the 12-day visit, the Special Rapporteur met with the Prime Minister, H.E. Mr. Najib Mikati, the Speaker of Parliament, H.E. Mr. Nabih Berri, the Minister of Energy and Water, the Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Public Health, the Minister of Labour, the Minister of Economy and Trade, the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, the Minister of the Displaced, the Minister of Public Finance and the Central Bank Governor, as well as the President of the Central Inspection, the Director-General of the National Social Security Fund, and senior officials of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, and the Ministry of Environment. He also met with municipal councils of Bourj Hammoud and Bebnine, representatives of the Social Development Center in Bebnine, the National Human Rights Commission, representatives of civil society organizations, international organizations, ambassadors and members of the diplomatic community. Finally the Special Rapporteur had the opportunity to hold discussions with adults, youths, women and children experiencing poverty, refugees, migrant workers, persons with disabilities in Beirut, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek and Bekaa. He sincerely thanks all the persons who shared their views, perspectives and experience with him.
The Special Rapporteur visited Lebanon as the country was facing the conjunction of four crises. First, the arrival of refugees from Syria, following the outbreak of civil conflict in that country, has put the public services in Lebanon and humanitarian agencies under severe pressure. The solidarity of the Lebanese people towards the Syrian refugees has been remarkable. There are today 882,532 refugees and asylum seekers registered with UNHCR in Lebanon, including 851,717 Syrian refugees. New registrations of Syrian refugees have been suspended by the Lebanese Government since 2015, however, and the actual number of Syrians in need of international protection in Lebanon is therefore unknown. (The Government estimates that 1.5 million Syrian refugees are in the country, but these numbers are largely consensus and not evidence based.) The current crisis has severely impacted this population and is also now leading to increased tensions between host communities and refugees: during his visit, the Special Rapporteur was repeatedly confronted with comments hostile to the Syrian refugees, and it has been reported that refugees from Syria have been denied access to shops selling subsidized items, or have had to pay for basic consumer items at inflated prices.1
Second, the macro-economic conditions have seriously deteriorated, particularly after 2019. Lebanon’s GDP fell from 55 billion USD in 2017 to an estimated 33 billion USD in 2020, a contraction that is unprecedented in times of peace.2 The announcement by the previous administration, on 7 March 2020, that the country would default on its debt and seek a restructuration of its foreign debt (an announcement made just two days before the country was to repay 1.2 billion USD in Eurobonds), as well as a favourable arrangement with the Central Bank (Banque du Liban – BdL), has temporarily allowed the fiscal balance to be maintained, since the sharp fall in public revenues due to the shrinking of the economy was compensated by the reduced expenditure on debt repayment.
However, the primary balance (not including debt repayments) deteriorated in 2020 to -2.8 percent of the GDP, and this imbalance is now severely restricting the ability of the government to provide essential services to the population and to maintain the existing infrastructures. The foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank have been severely depleted, as capital inflows have been declining since 2011 despite the high interest rates provided by the BdL to attract foreign capital, both in order to service the debt and to pay for essential imports (fuel, medicine and wheat) at the official rate of exchange between the LBP and the US dollar. This has forced a significant drop in imports since 2020, with severe consequences on the population. It also has led to very high inflation rate: year-on-year inflation rates reached 146 percent in December 2020, and according to WFP data, the cost of food in Lebanon increased by 404% between October 2019 and June 2021 — a particular source of concern in a context where for more than half of the population, food accounts for more than 30 percent of the household’s expenditures.3
These developments have had massive impacts on poverty. Households whose incomes are labelled in LBP saw their purchasing power fall significantly with the devaluation of the lira, putting imported goods often beyond their reach. This includes basic items such as food and fuel, and therefore the cost of transport and of producing electricity through generators: at the time of the visit, 20 liters of gasoline were worth almost one half of the legal minimum wage,4 making it increasingly expensive or even unaffordable for employees to travel to work or for children to attend school. Only the privileged, who either receive a salary in US dollars or receive remittances from relatives abroad, have escaped this general impoverishment process.
Moreover, many public services rapidly deteriorated, both because their operating costs increased due to the devaluation of the lira (and the need to pay suppliers at inflated prices or in US dollars), and because social needs suddenly increased — with many households unable to afford seeking services from the private sector. For instance, a large number of pupils formerly in private schools sought to move to public schools, as private schools became unaffordable. Patients who, in the past, might have opted for private hospitals turned to public hospitals, which are now overwhelmed by the surge in demand: the Special Rapporteur met with personnel from the Tripoli Governmental Hospital who are exhausted by this situation and who explained that the hospital is now functioning far beyond its capacity. Even the middle class who have certain bank deposits cannot cash these deposits, and face, like the other parts of the population, the breakdown of public services.
Third, the Covid-19 pandemic affected Lebanon as it did other countries, but with particular impacts due to the vulnerability of the poorest segments of the population. At the time of the visit, about 650,000 people had contracted the virus, and more than 8,500 people had died as a result. The pandemic put the public health system to the test. It led to school closures starting in March 2020. This affected particularly children from low-income households who were unable to follow classes online, due to their weak access to internet, to the fact that electricity was only available for a few hours per day, combined with the absence of a laptop at home: the Special Rapporteur met many families who had only one mobile phone for the whole household, making it impossible for the children to continue to pursue education; and 25% of families reported to Unicef that they were unable to afford the tools required to continue online learning.5
Although the authorities appear to have no precise data on the evolution of the dropout rates, anecdotal evidence and the testimonies received suggest that the dropout rates soared both for that reason and because many households, impacted by the financial crisis, encouraged their children to work. The single positive lesson from the pandemic, however, was that it allowed to roll out the IMPACT Platform, a database of households supervised by the Central Inspection, which could prove its effectiveness in accelerating the distribution of vaccines and should support in the next few months the deployment of expanded cash transfer schemes.
Fourth, finally, the Beirut port blast of August 4th, 2020, resulted not only in 219 deaths, but also in hundreds of thousands of people made homeless, with a large number of homes deteriorated to a more or less significant extent. 70,000 workers lost their jobs. The blast damaged at least 183 schools, impacting access to education for more than 85,000 children. The Special Rapporteur visited the neighborhoods most affected, and he heard testimonies of victims who feel entirely abandoned by the State. In the immediate aftermath of the blast, a number of non-governmental organisations were established in order to provide support to victims. But the support they could provide was highly uneven, sometimes based on sectarian affiliation, unaccountable, and grossly insufficient.
These crises obviously have severely affected people in poverty, and the situation may further worsen soon, as the impacts on businesses are being felt. Behind these crises however, there is another crisis, one that is perhaps even more difficult to address: it is a crisis of trust. The population feels abandoned by a government that is incapable of guaranteeing their rights or addressing their basic needs. For many with whom the Special Rapporteur spoke, the State has become simply irrelevant: their coping strategies are based on self-help and improvisation, while the main strategy of the government has been described as “kicking the can down the road”.
- Groups at risk
While the impoverishment of the residents in Lebanon is general, some groups are particularly vulnerable, and they have been particularly hard hit by this combination of crises.
a) Stateless persons
No official records exist for stateless persons, who remain hidden for the State, except for those known as “Qayd Dars” (under study) who have a specific register as foreigners of unidentified nationality.6 The Special Rapporteur spoke with stateless individuals all over Lebanon, including people born in Lebanon and in other countries but raised in Lebanon. While in theory stateless individuals can register their birth certificate even after a year has passed since their birth, this requires going through judicial…
Statement by Professor Olivier De Schutter, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme